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The Devil Is in the Deliberation: Thinking Too
Much Reduces Preference Consistency
LORAN F. NORDGREN
AP DIJKSTERHUIS*
In five experiments we found that deliberation reduces preference consistency. In
experiments 1 and 2, participants who deliberated on their preferences were less
consistent in their evaluations compared to those who did not deliberate. Experi-
ment 3 demonstrated that this effect is due to the impediment of deliberation and
not to the benefit of nondeliberation. We hypothesized that deliberation leads to
the inconsistent weighting of information, especially when the information is com-
plex. As such, we predicted and found in experiments 4 and 5 that the extent to
which deliberation decreases preference consistency depends upon the complexity
of the information.
Consumers expect and want consistent preferences. Pref-erence consistency is important because consumer de-
cisions, particularly significant consumer decisions, need to
have enduring value. For example, selecting a new (and
expensive) painting for the living room is done with the
expectation that you will continue to find the painting beau-
tiful for many years afterward. Even for goods that lose
their value relatively quickly—such as clothes and other
fashion trends—people want their preferences to remain
consistent throughout the expected time frame. A new bath-
ing suit need not look good next season, but it should con-
tinue to look good throughout this season.
But how can we ensure that today’s preferences will
hold up tomorrow? The popular notion is that consistent
preferences stem from a deliberative thought-processing
strategy. We tend to trust an effortful process that reflects
a careful, systematic consideration of all aspects of the
evaluative object. Inconsistent evaluations, on the other
hand, are believed to stem from a quick, intuitive thought-
processing strategy. Imagine the process of purchasing a car.
The ostensibly best approach to making such an important
decision would be to conduct a systematic analysis of each
aspect of the car you are considering buying (e.g., poor
safety rating, great gas mileage, and average durability, etc.)
and then to determine the relative importance of each of
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these features (e.g., with today’s oil prices, gas mileage is
the most important factor to consider). Basing one’s judg-
ment on this kind of careful, deliberative approach would
seem to be the best platform for enduring preferences
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982).
Yet, there is reason to believe that, rather than being ben-
eficial, deliberation may in fact lead to more inconsistent
preferences. This notion finds support in the growing body
of research that demonstrates that conscious thought often
undermines the quality of people’s judgments (Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren 2006).
Wilson and his colleagues, for example, have shown that
introspective reasoning leads to a variety of suboptimal
judgments. They have found that deliberation reduces sat-
isfaction with personal judgments (Wilson et al. 1993) and
attitude-behavior consistency (Wilson et al.1984) and leads
to less agreement with expert opinion about an evaluative
object (Halberstadt and Levine 1999; Johnson and Raab
2003; Wilson and Schooler 1991).
This counterintuitive finding has generally been thought
to be a consequence of the limited processing capacity of
deliberative thought (see Dijksterhuis [2004]; Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren [2006]; Dijksterhuis et al. [2006] for more
details). In this sense deliberation resembles a spotlight:
deliberation focuses attention on a specific aspect of an ob-
ject but is too narrow to take all aspects into account. This
narrow focus disturbs the natural weighting of attributes by
putting disproportionate weight on attributes that are ac-
cessible, plausible, and easy to verbalize and therefore puts
too little weight on other attributes. According to Wilson
and colleagues (1993, 332), “introspection . . . can change
an optimal weighing scheme into a suboptimal one. When
people analyze reasons, they might focus on those attributes
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of the attitude object that seem like plausible causes of the
evaluations but were not weighted heavily before.”
To demonstrate this point, Wilson and colleagues (1993;
see also Dijksterhuis and van Olden 2006) had participants
choose between art posters under two different conditions.
Some participants were asked to analyze their thoughts by
listing their reasons for liking or disliking each poster,
whereas control participants merely made a choice. All par-
ticipants were given their favorite art poster to take home
and were phoned a few weeks later. Participants who ana-
lyzed their choices were less satisfied with their posters than
control participants. Crucially, they demonstrated that de-
liberation hindered the evaluative process because it led
people to focus on a limited number of attributes at the
expense of other relevant attributes.
Although these studies demonstrate that deliberation can
undermine the weighting of attributes, it is unclear whether
suboptimal weighting undermines preference consistency.
After all, the poor weighting of information can itself be
consistent. If one judges the attractiveness of various apart-
ments solely on the basis of the number of electrical sockets
in the kitchen, one would see this as an instance of poor
weighting. However, as long as one counts correctly, one
will reach the same judgment each time. For deliberation
to hinder consistency it requires that deliberation leads to
inconsistent weighting on information.
Some evidence for this notion comes out of a study by
Levine, Halberstadt, and Goldstone (1996). They had par-
ticipants evaluate a large number of faces that varied along
six dimensions (such as the shape of the nose). Participants
either merely evaluated these faces or they had to think about
the reasons for their evaluations before doing so. Using
multidimensional scaling they found that participants who
deliberated displayed less consistent weighting of the at-
tributes from trial to trial. For example, a deliberator might
at one point find a hooked nose to be attractive and later
on find it less so. It is important to note that their study
examined how consistently deliberators evaluated features
of the face (i.e., aspects of the object) but did not examine
whether deliberation led to more inconsistent evaluations of
the object itself. This issue is taken up in the present study.
We hypothesized that deliberation reduces the consistency
of consumer preferences. This hypothesis was based on the
knowledge that deliberation leads to poor weighting (as is
shown by evidence) and the idea that deliberation causes
inconsistent weighting of attributes. Deliberation, one may
say, introduces decisional noise by poor and unsystematic
weighting.
THE PRESENT STUDIES
In five experiments we examined the prediction that de-
liberation reduces preference consistency. The same basic
paradigm was used in each experiment. Participants were
asked to evaluate a set of objects (between 7 and 12) at the
beginning of the experimental session and then rate the same
objects again 50 minutes later. Half of the participants made
their evaluations deliberatively, and the other half made their
evaluations without deliberation. In experiment 1 participants
evaluated Chinese ideograms. In experiment 2 participants
rated high- versus low-quality paintings, which enabled us to
examine whether the consistency that nondeliberation affords
comes at the cost of accuracy. With the aid of a control
condition, experiment 3 tested whether the relative difference
between the deliberation and nondeliberation conditions in
the previous experiments is due to the benefits of a nonde-
liberative approach or to the limitation of a deliberative ap-
proach (as we predict).
Finally, experiments 4 and 5 examined how deliberation
hinders consistency by testing a moderator that stems di-
rectly from our reasoning that deliberation disturbs the nat-
ural weighting of information. When the information that a
preference is based on is very simple, weighting is hardly
an issue (the deliberative spotlight captures all the infor-
mation). Hence, we hypothesized that when the judgment
task was very simple, the difference in inconsistency be-
tween deliberators and nondeliberators would disappear.
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment examined the effect of deliberative, as
compared to nondeliberative, evaluation on the consistency
of people’s preferences. We asked participants to rate a num-
ber of Chinese ideograms for attractiveness on two separate
occasions. We predicted that deliberators would demonstrate
more inconsistent preferences than nondeliberators.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-two undergraduate students (22
women and 10 men) participated for course credit or for
money (7 euros).
Procedure. Participants were seated at a computer in a
private cubicle. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of two conditions, the deliberative or the nondeliberative.
Participants were told, “you are about to see a number of
Chinese ideograms. We would like you to rate how attractive
you find each ideogram.” Participants in the deliberation
condition were then told, “New research has shown that
people can make more accurate judgments about the at-
tractiveness of objects if they make very deliberate deci-
sions. This means that for each ideogram you should think
very hard about the object, trying to generate clear reasons
why you find it attractive or unattractive, before making
your final evaluation.” Participants in the nondeliberative
condition were told, “New research has shown that people
can make more accurate judgments about the attractiveness
of objects if they make quick decisions based on a gut
feeling. This means that for each ideogram you should base
your judgment on your first impression of the ideogram. If
the first moment you look at an ideogram it seems attractive
(or unattractive), then rate it as such.” The instructions for
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the second session closely followed the first session instruc-
tions.
Participants rated 12 ideograms at the beginning and end
of the experimental session. There were approximately 50
minutes separating the two time sessions. Of the 12 ideo-
grams presented at each session, eight identical ideograms
were used in both sessions, and eight ideograms were used
in only one of the sessions. Thus, each session contained
the eight repeated ideograms and four unique ideograms.
Our analyses focus only on those eight repeated ideograms.
Adding the additional ideograms was done to mask the pur-
pose of the study and to render explicit memory for indi-
vidual ideograms unlikely.
In each session, the ideograms were presented in random
order. Participants rated each ideogram on a 100-millimeter
scale, with Very Unattractive and Very Attractive as the end
points on the scale. Although there were no values visible
on the scale (in order to make explicit memory for the
evaluations impossible), scores ranged from 25 to 25. For
each ideogram we measured the evaluative rating and the
time it took to make the evaluation. Consistency was mea-
sured as the absolute difference between the first and second
evaluations, with scores ranging from zero (entirely consis-
tent) to 50 (entirely inconsistent).
Results
Manipulation Check. We expected that participants
who were asked to deliberate would take more time in mak-
ing their evaluation than participants who were not asked
to deliberate. To ensure that the manipulation was successful
we compared the average amount of time each condition
evaluated the ideograms. To calculate this comparison we
averaged the eight decision times at each of the two sessions.
As predicted, in the first session participants in the delib-
erative condition evaluated each ideogram for a longer pe-
riod of time ( seconds; ) than partic-Mp 4.62 SDp 2.41
ipants in the nondeliberative condition ( seconds;Mp 2.40
, , ), . Like-2SDp 0.75 F(1, 32)p 12.36 pp .001 h p .29
wise, in the second session participants in the deliberative
condition evaluated each ideogram for a longer period of
time ( seconds; ) than participants inMp 3.37 SDp 1.37
the nondeliberative condition ( seconds;Mp 1.88 SDp
, , ), .20.57 F(1, 32)p 16.11 p ! .001 h p .35
Preference Consistency. We next examined the pre-
diction that participants who made deliberative evaluations
were more inconsistent in their preferences. For each ide-
ogram we measured the absolute difference in rating from
time 1 and time 2 and then averaged these eight absolute
difference scores to generate one overall inconsistency
score. In this and the remaining studies, higher scores char-
acterize greater inconsistency. As predicted, participants
who made deliberative evaluations were more inconsistent
in their preferences ( ; ) than partici-Mp 7.85 SDp 2.93
pants who made nondeliberative evaluations ( ;Mp 5.83
, , ), .2SDp 2.54 F(1, 32)p 4.30 pp .05 h p .13
EXPERIMENT 2
In the previous experiment we demonstrated that a de-
liberative approach can decrease the consistency of one’s
preferences. This finding provides initial evidence for the
benefits of a nondeliberative processing style. One limitation
of this conclusion might be that the consistency gained by
a nondeliberative approach comes at the cost of some other
aspect of the evaluation, such as the accuracy of the judg-
ment. To address this issue, we asked participants to evaluate
the quality of paintings. Half of these paintings are consid-
ered to be of the highest quality (they belong to the Museum
of Modern Art in New York [MOMA]), and half are con-
sidered to be of the lowest quality (they belong to the Mu-
seum of Bad Art in Boston [MOBA]). This design enabled
us to assess both the consistency and the accuracy of par-
ticipant’s preferences.
Methods
Participants. Seventy-three students (53 women and 20
men) participated for course credit or for money (7 euros).
Procedure. Participants were asked to rate eight paint-
ings, four high-quality, MOMA paintings, and four low-
quality, MOBA paintings (paintings were downloaded from
the institutions’ respective Web sites). As in the previous
experiment, participants rated the paintings once at the be-
ginning of the experimental session and again at the end of
the experimental session (approximately 50 minutes later).
Additional paintings were included at both time points in
order to mask the purpose of the experiment. The instruc-
tions for the deliberators and nondeliberators were modified
from those in experiment 1.
Results
Manipulation Check. As in the previous experiment, at
time 1 participants in the deliberation condition spent longer
evaluating the paintings ( seconds; ) thanMp 3.93 SDp 2.33
participants in the nondeliberative condition ( sec-Mp 2.30
onds; , , ), .2SDp 1.15 F(1, 73)p 14.85 p ! .001 h p .17
Likewise, at time 2 participants in the deliberation condition
spent longer evaluating the paintings ( seconds;Mp 2.26
) than participants in the nondeliberative con-SDp 1.08
dition (Mp 1.58 seconds; SDp 0.39, ,F(1, 73) p 13.21
pp .001), h2p .15.
Preference Consistency. We tested whether deliberation
hindered the consistency of participants’ preferences for the
paintings. As expected, participants who deliberated were
more inconsistent in their preferences ( ;Mp 3.82 SDp
) than participants who did not deliberate ( ;1.83 Mp 3.09
, , ), . This re-2SDp 1.38 F(1, 73)p 3.81 pp .05 h p .05
sult replicates the findings from experiment 1.
Preference Accuracy. We next examined whether, col-
lapsing across conditions, participants could distinguish be-
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tween the quality of the MOMA and MOBA paintings. Par-
ticipants were able to differentiate between the two types
of paintings, as they rated the MOMA paintings to be of
higher quality ( ) than the MOBA paintingsMp 0.74
( ; , ). Yet crucially, de-Mp 3.21 t(73)p 3.01 pp .004
liberators did not rate MOMA (high-quality) paintings as
more attractive ( ; ) than nondeliber-Mp 1.24 SDp 6.06
ators ( ; , , NS). Like-Mp 0.27 SDp 6.81 t(73)p .63
wise, deliberators did not rate MOBA (low-quality) paint-
ings as less attractive ( ; ) thanMp 2.80 SDp 7.12
nondeliberators ( ; , ,Mp 3.60 SDp 7.75 t(73)p .46
NS). In fact, to the extent there is any difference at all, the
nondeliberators appear to be more accurate in their evalu-
ations. Taken together, these findings suggest that not only
does a nondeliberative approach lead to more consistent
preferences, but it does so without sacrificing the accuracy
of the judgment.
EXPERIMENT 3
The previous experiments have demonstrated a relative
difference in preference consistency between the delibera-
tion and nondeliberation conditions. Our hypothesis entails
that deliberation disrupts consistency. But whereas we
pressed people to deliberate in our experimental conditions,
we also explicitly asked people not to deliberate in other
conditions. For this reason, it is not fully clear what drives
our effect. After all, some evidence suggests that people
evaluate objects almost instantaneously (Giner-Sorolla, Gar-
cia, and Bargh 1999). If evaluative judgments are by default
automatic, the difference in consistency might be due to the
advantage of the nondeliberative condition as opposed to
the disadvantage of deliberation.
Thus, experiment 3 examined whether deliberation hin-
ders preference consistency (as we propose) or whether non-
deliberation enhances preference consistency, or both. To
test this idea we compared a deliberation and nondeliber-
ation condition with a no-instruction or control condition.
Based on our hypothesis that deliberation causes incon-
sistent weighting of attributes, we expected that a delib-
erative processing strategy actively hinders preference con-
sistency. In other words, we predicted that participants in
the deliberation condition would form more inconsistent
preferences than would participants in the nondeliberation
and no-instruction conditions. Moreover, we expected no
differences in preference consistency between the nondelib-
eration and the no-instruction conditions.
In this experiment we measured the consistency of taste
preferences. We had participants rate their preferences for
a variety of flavors such as chocolate, vanilla, and cinnamon.
Experiments 1 and 2 involved forming visual-based pref-
erences—participants looked at photos of ideograms or ab-
stract art. In this experiment we had participants form taste-
based preferences. Thus, this study also tested whether the
inconsistency effects found in the earlier experiments gen-
eralize to different perceptual systems.
Methods
Participants. Sixty students (42 women and 18 men)
participated for course credit or for money (5 euros).
Procedure. In this experiment participants were asked
to indicate their preference for jellybean flavors. Participants
evaluated 15 jellybeans at the beginning and end of an ex-
perimental session. There were approximately 40 minutes
separating the two time sessions. Of the 15 jellybean flavors
presented at each session, six were used in both sessions:
chocolate, lemon, cinnamon, coffee, watermelon, and bub-
blegum. Our analyses focus only on the six repeated flavors,
as adding the additional flavors was done to mask the pur-
pose of the study and to render explicit memory for indi-
vidual flavors unlikely.
In each session, participants were presented with 15 paper
cups. Each cup was labeled with a number from one to 15.
Participants were given a randomly generated number se-
quence and were instructed to taste each jellybean in the
assigned order. Participants rated each jellybean on a 100-
millimeter scale, with Very Bad and Very Good as the end
points on the scale (as in the previous experiments). The
deliberation and nondeliberation conditions used instruc-
tions adapted from the previous experiments. Participants
in the no-instruction condition were simply instructed to
taste each jellybean in the assigned order.
Results
Manipulation Check. As predicted, at time 1 partici-
pants in the deliberation condition spent more time evalu-
ating the flavors ( ; ) than did partici-Mp 8.22 SDp 2.23
pants in the nondeliberation condition ( ;Mp 5.70 SDp
) and, crucially, the no-instruction condition (1.34 Mp
; , , ), .26.17 SDp 1.16 F(2, 60)p 13.30 pp .001 h p .32
Likewise, at time 2 participants in the deliberation condition
spent more time evaluating the flavors ( ;Mp 6.14 SDp
) than did participants in the nondeliberation condition1.52
(Mp 4.46; SDp 1.27) and the no-instruction condition (M
p 4.98; SDp 0.89, , pp .001), h2p .25.F(2, 60)p 14.95
At both time 1 and time 2, decision time did not differ between
the nondeliberation and no-instruction conditions.
Preference Consistency. We predicted that participants
in the deliberation condition would form more inconsistent
preferences than would participants in the nondeliberation
and no-instruction conditions. As predicted, the deliberation
condition formed more inconsistent preferences (Mp
; ) than did the nondeliberation condition4.72 SDp 1.66
( ; ) and the no-instruction conditionMp 3.19 SDp 1.71
( ; , , ),Mp 3.44 SDp 2.21 F(2, 60)p 3.81 pp .028
. Moreover, we found no difference in preference2h p .11
consistency for the nondeliberation and no-instruction con-
ditions. This experiment supports our view that a deliberative
processing style actively hinders preference consistency.
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FIGURE 1
MEAN INCONSISTENCY RATING OF ATTRACTIVENESS
(SIMPLE VS. COMPLEX APARTMENTS) BY CONDITION
(DELIBERATIVE VS. NONDELIBERATIVE)
EXPERIMENT 4
The previous experiments demonstrated that deliberation
decreases the consistency of people’s preferences. As in Wil-
son’s poster study, we explain this finding in terms of delib-
eration’s tendency to disturb the natural weighting of infor-
mation. As such, we think that there are some circumstances
in which deliberation may not hamper preference consis-
tency. Specifically, we expect that the complexity of the
evaluation can moderate this effect. Since inconsistency is
a consequence of poor weighting, creating a very simple
situation in which weighting hardly plays a role should make
deliberate preferences more consistent.
In the present experiment we examined the moderating
role of complexity on preference consistency in the context
of judging six hypothetical apartments. Half of the apart-
ments were very simple (contain three attributes) and half
were complex (contain nine attributes). We expected delib-
eration to lead to greater inconsistency when evaluating the
complex apartments, and we expected this effect to attenuate
when evaluating the simple apartments.
Methods
Participants. Ninety students (66 women and 24 men)
participated for course credit or for money (7 euros).
Procedure. Participants were told that they were going
to be presented with information about six hypothetical
apartments (labeled A–F). Each apartment was described
by three primary attributes (location, price, and size). Half
of the apartments were only described in terms of these
three primary attributes (simple apartments). The other half
of the apartments were described in terms of the three pri-
mary attributes and six additional secondary attributes, such
as whether the apartment has carpet, a terrace, or a train
stop nearby. The attributes were presented in random order.
Each attribute was presented on the center of the screen for
2 seconds, followed immediately by the next attribute. After
viewing the attributes, participants evaluated the apartment
on the same continuous scale used in the previous experi-
ments, from Very Negative to Very Positive. The apartments
were presented in random order. Otherwise, instructions
were identical to experiment 1.
Results
Manipulation Check. The manipulation was successful.
In the first session participants in the deliberation condition
spent more time evaluating the apartments ( sec-Mp 3.52
onds; ) than participants in the nondeliberationSDp 1.24
condition ( seconds; ,Mp 2.75 SDp 1.02 F(1, 90)p
, ), . Likewise, in the second session210.00 pp .002 h p .10
participants in the deliberation condition spent more time
evaluating the apartments ( seconds; )Mp 3.13 SDp 1.09
than participants in the nondeliberation condition (Mp
seconds; , , ),2.51 SDp 0.70 F(1, 90)p 9.80 pp .002
. Overall, there was also a difference in time spent2h p .10
evaluating the different types of apartment, such that partici-
pants spent more time evaluating complex apartments (Mp
seconds; ) than simple apartments (3.37 SDp 1.26 Mp
seconds; , , ).2.65 SDp 0.95 t(90)p 4.88 pp .001
Preference Consistency. We examined the effect of the
manipulation on the preference consistency for the two
apartment types (simple vs. complex) using a repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. There was a main effect for apartment type,
as participants were more inconsistent in evaluating the com-
plex apartments ( ; ) than the simpleMp 5.95 SDp 3.40
apartments ( ; , , ppMp 4.70 SDp 2.60 F(1, 90)p 6.00
.01), h2p .06.
Crucially, there was an interaction between apartment com-
plexity and processing style (F p 3.56, pp .06), h2p 04.
For the complex apartments, deliberation led to more incon-
sistent preferences (Mp 6.60; SDp 3.27) than did nonde-
liberation (Mp 5.18; SDp 3.13, , ppF(1, 90)p 4.06
.04), h2p .04. However, for the simple apartments there was
no difference between the deliberation (Mp 4.54; SDp
2.75) and the nondeliberation conditions (Mp 4.91; SDp
2.43, , NS; see fig. 1).F(1, 90)p 0.46
EXPERIMENT 5
The previous experiment provides evidence for the notion
that complexity moderates the effect of deliberation on eval-
uative consistency. In that experiment complexity was de-
fined objectively—the number of pieces of information each
evaluative object contained. Yet, most objects we encounter
do not offer such clearly defined dimensions. For instance,
what makes an apartment simple or complex? If deliberation
only hinders consistency for complex objects, the findings
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FIGURE 2
MEAN INCONSISTENCY RATING OF ATTRACTIVENESS BY
DELIBERATIVE SCOPES (SIMPLE, CONTROL, OR COMPLEX)
from experiments 1 and 2 imply that the ideograms and
painting used in those studies must have been complex. In
what sense is an ideogram complex? In experiment 4 we
argue for a “subjective complexity,” reflected not in the
characteristics of the object itself but, rather, determined by
the richness of the evaluation.
We sought to replicate the findings from experiment 4 by
demonstrating that the extent to which deliberation decreases
preference consistency depends upon the complexity of the
underlying weighting process. We manipulated the com-
plexity of the weighting processes by pressing people to
base their judgments on either one or several evaluative
dimensions. We expected that the complex deliberators
(based on more evaluative dimensions) would demonstrate
greater inconsistency than would simple deliberators.
Methods
Participants. Ninety-three students (59 women and 34
men) participated for course credit or for money (7 euros).
Procedure. This experiment consisted of three condi-
tions: simple deliberation, complex deliberation, and control
deliberation. The procedure for the control deliberation con-
dition was identical to the deliberation condition in exper-
iment 1. The aim of the simple deliberation condition was
to have participants basis their attractiveness ratings only
on one dimension of the ideogram—its symmetry: “When
you see each ideogram carefully look at it and decide
whether you think its form is symmetrical or asymmetrical
and then rate it accordingly. For example, if you find sym-
metrical ideograms to be more attractive than asymmetrical
ideograms, then rate a very symmetrical ideogram as very
attractive.”
In the complex deliberation condition participants were
instructed to judge the ideograms in terms of five basic
attributes: complexity, symmetry, line form (straight or
rounded), dimension (vertical or horizontal), and composi-
tion (balanced or unbalanced). “When you see each ideo-
gram carefully look at it and decide whether you think it is
simple or complex, symmetrical or asymmetrical, etc., and
decide whether these attributes create an attractive or un-
attractive ideogram.” After these instructions, participants
viewed sample ideograms to practice evaluating them in
terms of the attributes that they were instructed to take into
account. Otherwise, this experiment was identical to the
deliberation condition in experiment 1.
Results
Manipulation Check. In this experiment we measured
the amount of time participants spent deliberating. Although
there were no predictions about differences in decision time
by condition, it seemed reasonable to assume that partici-
pants in the simple deliberation condition might spend less
time deliberating than participants in the complex deliber-
ation condition. There was in fact no significant difference
for decision time among the three conditions. Nevertheless,
decision time was used as a covariate in the subsequent
analyses.
Preference Consistency. We predicted a linear trend,
with participants who focused on only one attribute (simple
deliberation) expected to be the most consistent in their
preferences, whereas participants who incorporated a large
number of attributes into their evaluation (complex delib-
eration) expected to be the least consistent. In support of
this prediction, participants in the simple deliberation con-
dition formed more consistent preferences ( ;Mp 5.61
) than did participants in the control deliberationSDp 2.69
condition ( ; ) and the complex delib-Mp 6.83 SDp 2.34
eration condition ( ; , ,Mp 7.25 SDp 2.80 F(2, 93)p 3.53
), (see fig. 2).2pp .03 h p .07
This experiment replicates the earlier finding that com-
plexity moderates the effect of deliberation on preference
consistency and demonstrates that complexity does not need
to be defined in terms of the objective features of a consumer
object. Instead, it appears that subjective complexity—or
the richness of the evaluation itself—can moderate delib-
eration’s influence on preference consistency.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
People expect a degree of consistency from their con-
sumer decisions. The present experiments examined the idea
that how people think about consumer objects might influ-
ence the consistency of their preferences for those objects.
Although we might expect consistent preferences to stem
from careful, deliberative reasoning, we in fact found the
very opposite. Whether evaluating abstract objects (Chinese
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ideograms) or actual consumer items (paintings, apartments,
and jellybeans), people who deliberated on their preferences
were less consistent than those who made nondeliberative
judgments.
The present research contributes to the growing literature
on the problem of deliberating over consumer decisions. In
the context of preference construction, for example, earlier
work has shown that deliberation can hinder the systematic
processing of consumer decisions (Toresdillas and Chaiken
1999). This work regards deliberation as a form of distrac-
tion, pulling attention away from the most relevant infor-
mation. This perspective fits well with our finding that task
complexity moderates the effect of deliberation on prefer-
ence consistency. We found that the extent to which delib-
eration decreases preference consistency depends upon the
complexity of the consumer object (experiments 4 and 5).
We found that when the evaluative object (experiment 4) or
the evaluative process (experiment 5) is complex, deliber-
ation leads to inconsistent preferences. On the other hand,
when the evaluative object or process is simple, deliberation
is no longer a hindrance to preference consistency.
In our experiments, thinking more hindered consistency
and did not improve decision accuracy (experiment 2). Our
findings thus highlight the importance of nonconscious in-
fluences on consumer decision making (Bargh 2002; Dijk-
sterhuis et al. 2005; Johar, Maheswaran, and Peracchio
2006). For example, nonconscious exposure to consumer
information can have a substantial impact on consumer
decisions (Shapiro, MacInnis, and Heckler 1997). Mandel
and Johnson (2002), for example, found that priming prod-
uct attributes through background colors and images influ-
enced consumer choice, even though the participants had
no insight into this effect. Likewise, research on the “de-
liberation-without-attention” effect has found, both in the
laboratory as well as among actual shoppers, that purchases
of complex products were more favorable when decisions
were made in the absence of attentive deliberation (Dijk-
sterhuis et al. 2006).
Although the take-home message of this article is that
complex consumer decisions benefit from a nondeliberative
evaluative process, the consequences of deliberation may
have equally important implications for the marketplace.
Earlier we compared deliberation to a spotlight—focusing
attention on specific aspects of an object while ignoring
other attributes. If deliberative attention naturally gravitates
toward highly salient or novel aspects of an object, marketers
might use a deliberative mind-set to focus consumers’ at-
tention toward particular attributes. For example, if a car
boasts one particularly good feature (e.g., safety) but has a
number of other negative features (e.g., expensive, bad gas
mileage, poor handling), a car salesman might encourage a
potential car buyer to deliberate over the pros and cons of
the car, while at the same time emphasizing the importance
of safety. In this way, the disturbed weighting of attributes
created by deliberation might be used to highlight the one
sellable feature and draw attention away from the unattrac-
tive features.
Although this is one of the few studies to address ex-
plicitly the issue of preference consistency, a host of psy-
chological theories are at least in part grounded in the notion
that consistency is a beneficial feature of judgments. The
impact bias, for example, demonstrates that people often
believe an emotional event will have a longer-reaching im-
pact than it in fact does (Gilbert et al. 1998). One could
argue that one reason for such biases is that people judge
these events inconsistently. That is, what appears to be good
now may appear to be less good later on, simply because
our judgmental apparatus is far from flawless. And ironi-
cally, it gets worse when we deliberate.
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